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Abstract
In immature democracies, businessmen run for public oﬃce to gain direct control
over policy, whereas in mature democracies they typically rely on other means of in-
ﬂuence. We develop a simple model to show that businessmen run for oﬃce only when
two conditions hold. First, as in many immature democracies, institutions which make
reneging on campaign promises costly must be poorly developed. In such environments,
oﬃce holders have monopoly power which can be used to extract rents, and business-
men may run to capture those rents. Second, however, the returns to businessmen from
policy inﬂuence must not be too large, as otherwise the endogenous rents from holding
oﬃce draw professional politicians into the race, crowding out businessmen candidates.
Analysis of data on Russian gubernatorial elections supports these predictions, showing
that 1) businessman candidates are less likely in regions with high media freedom and
government transparency, institutions which raise the cost of reneging on campaign
promises, and 2) businessman candidates are less likely in regions where returns to
policy inﬂuence (measured by regional resource abundance) are large, but only where
media are unfree and government nontransparent.
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Zhuravskaya: New Economic School, CEFIR, and CEPR, ezhuravskaya@ceﬁr.ru.In mature democracies, businessmen inﬂuence public policy by lobbying elected oﬃcials
and providing campaign ﬁnance to professional politicians. In immature democracies, busi-
nessmen often employ an alternative strategy, running for public oﬃce themselves in order to
further their business interests despite high opportunity costs of doing so. What accounts for
this diﬀerence in behavior? Why should businessmen in some political environments bypass
“conventional” means of inﬂuence and directly participate in politics? This paper addresses
these questions.
Businessmen are active in the political arenas of many immature democracies. In the
contemporary world, the “tycoons” who dominate party politics in Thailand and “oligarchs”
who hold political oﬃce at all levels of government in Russia and Ukraine are prominent ex-
amples.1 “Businessman candidates” appear to be much less common in established democ-
racies, but the situation was once diﬀerent in many countries which today have mature
democratic institutions. For example, railroad magnates frequently held public oﬃce in the
nineteenth-century U.S. (Leland Stanford is only the best known example), American cities
were governed for decades before the First World War by local business elites, the late-
nineteenth-century Reichstag was populated to a large extent by businessmen, and Latin
American parliaments in the early twentieth century were dominated by estate owners.2
Arguably common to all these examples, and to immature democracies more generally,
is the absence of institutions which make it costly to renege on campaign promises (Persson
and Tabellini, 2000; Robinson and Verdier, 2002; Djankov et al., 2003; Keefer and Vlaicu,
2005; Keefer, 2006). For example, media freedom and government transparency are both
essential for citizens to be able to identify the relationship between electoral promises and ac-
1See, for instance, Laothamatas (1988) and Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang (2006) on Thailand;
Barnes (2003), Orttung (2004), Hale (2005), and Kryshtanovskaya (2005) on Russia; and “Kyiv Devel-
oper Eyes Rada, Council Seats,” Kyiv Post, March 28, 2002, “Ukrainian Paper Proﬁles New Lviv Mayor,”
Ukrayina Moloda (BBC Monitoring), April 4, 2003, and “Banker Wins Ukrainian By-Election,” Ukrainian
Television First Channel (BBC Monitoring), June 9, 2003 on Ukraine.
2Crandall (1950) discusses the political participation of railroad barons. Various authors have emphasized
the business background of 19th-century American urban political elites; see, e.g., Dahl (1961); Bradley and
Zald (1965); Pessen (1972); Kipp III (1977). Sheehan (1968) provides an account of German businessmen
in the 19th-century Reichstag. Zeitlin, Neuman and Ratcliﬀ (1976) discuss the role of estate owners in the
Chilean parliament in the early twentieth century.
1tions once in oﬃce, and so to punish oﬃce holders who have broken campaign promises (e.g.,
Sen, 1999; Reinikka and Svensson, 2005; Besley and Prat, Forthcoming). Strong political
parties serve a similar function, acting as reputational mechanisms which provide disincen-
tives for individual politicians to behave opportunistically (e.g., Alesina and Spear, 1988;
Cox and McCubbins, 1994; Aldrich, 1995). These institutions play an important role in dis-
ciplining politicians in mature democracies, and are typically poorly developed in immature
democracies. We argue that this is the key to understanding the phenomenon of business-
man candidacy: businessmen run for oﬃce only in the absence of institutions which make
reneging on campaign promises costly. We ﬁnd support for our arguments in an empirical
study of gubernatorial elections in contemporary Russia, a country with substantial regional
variation in the quality of political institutions.3
We explore the consequences for businessman candidacy of the presence or absence of such
institutions with a simple model of political competition in which campaign promises may or
may not be binding. As in the “citizen candidate” models of Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and
Besley and Coate (1997), entry is endogenous: both professional politicians and businessmen
may enter the race. At stake is a policy over which businessmen have conﬂicting preferences.
Businessmen can inﬂuence policy in three ways: by lobbying the election winner for favorable
policy treatment (but only when the election winner is unconstrained by electoral promises),
by providing campaign ﬁnance ex-ante (a strategy useful only when campaign promises
are binding), or by running for election. The main assumption of the model is that a
businessmen’s opportunity cost of running for public oﬃce is higher than a professional
politician’s. Unlike politicians, businessmen also have businesses to run while campaigning
for public oﬃce. Campaigning requires enormous time and eﬀort, both of which must be
diverted from business.4 Moreover, businessmen may need to spend additional time and
3One prominent example of a businessman candidate in the contemporary world actually comes from a
mature democracy. Italy’s Silvio Berlusconi is the exception that proves the rule: Berlusconi was able to
maintain control of his media empire even while serving as Italy’s prime minister. The apparent conﬂict
of interest has often been characterized as a threat to Italy’s democratic institutions (see, e.g., Blatmann,
2003).
4The following example may help to make the point: Alexander Khloponin, CEO of Russian nickel gi-
2money to overcome any advantage in political skill enjoyed by professional politicians.
Our model produces three key results. First, businessmen do not run for public oﬃce
when campaign promises are binding, as the logic of political competition forces both busi-
nessman and politician to adopt the same electoral platform, regardless of whether or not
campaign ﬁnance plays a role in the race. Given diﬀerences in opportunity costs of elec-
toral participation, businessmen sit out the race and pay professional politicians to run in
their place. Second, businessmen may run for public oﬃce when campaign promises are
not binding. In this case, policy is chosen by an election winner unconstrained by electoral
promises. The winner may, of course, be lobbied by businessmen, so businessmen run both
to save on lobbying costs and to acquire additional rents by being on the receiving end of the
lobbying process. Third, when campaign promises are not binding, businessman candidates
are less likely when their returns from policy inﬂuence are high. This paradoxical result
follows from the nature of policy choice when campaign promises are not binding. With the
election winner in a position to earn rents by granting or denying favors to businessmen,
there is a gain from holding oﬃce for professional politicians as well as businessmen. Given
professional politicians’ lower opportunity costs of running, businessmen are thus crowded
out of the race when returns from policy inﬂuence are large.
We test the predictions of this model using a comprehensive database on the business
aﬃliation of all Russian gubernatorial candidates between 1991 and 2005. Regarding the
ﬁrst two predictions, we ﬁnd that two measures of the regional institutional environment –
media freedom and government transparency – are negatively associated with the likelihood
of businessman candidacy. As both media freedom and government transparency raise the
ant Norilsk Nickel (the world’s largest producer of nickel and palladium), was elected governor of Taimyr
Autonomous Okrug in February 2001, and subsequently elected governor of Krasnoyarsk Krai in Septem-
ber 2002. After Khloponin entered politics Norilsk Nickel was eventually compelled to transfer Mikhail
Prokhorov, one of the two controlling owners of Norilsk Nickel, to the city of Norilsk in order to oversee
day-to-day management of the company. In addition to the obvious cost of diversion of talent from other
activities, there was the additional fact that Prokhorov – one of Russia’s ten richest individuals, with a net
worth of over ﬁve billion dollars – had to forsake his comfortable existence in Moscow and the south of
France for life above the Arctic Circle in a city with a mean annual temperature of 14.4 degrees Fahrenheit
(-9.8 degrees Celsius).
3cost of reneging on campaign promises, we interpret this as support for the hypothesis that
businessmen candidates are less likely when campaign promises are binding. We also ﬁnd
that a measure of the strength of political parties is negatively, though often insigniﬁcantly,
associated with businessman candidacy. Regarding the third prediction, we ﬁnd evidence
of a crowding-out eﬀect only in the presence of weak institutions: rents from holding oﬃce,
proxied by the share of regional employment in resource extraction, are negatively associated
with the incidence of businessman candidacy when government is nontransparent and media
unfree.
Our work complements Li, Meng and Zhang (2006), who examine the inﬂuence of market,
rather than political, institutions on participation by Chinese entrepreneurs in politics. More
generally, we contribute to the literature on the impact of institutions on economic and
political outcomes (e.g., Shepsle and Weingast, 1979; North and Weingast, 1989; Knack
and Keefer, 1995; Porta et al., 1997, 1999; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001, 2002;
Glaeser et al., 2004; Persson and Tabellini, 2005). Because a businessman’s opportunity cost
of political participation is higher than that of a professional politician, his decision to run
for oﬃce himself depends on whether his opportunity cost of running is oﬀset by any gain
from control over the policy process, a tradeoﬀ aﬀected by the institutional environment
in which the participation decision is made (Bartels and Brady, 2003; Besley, 2005; Besley,
Pande and Rao, 2006).
Our analysis also has parallels in the theory of the ﬁrm (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975,
1985; Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978; Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990)
and its application to politics (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). We study the political boundaries
of the ﬁrm: the choice between running for public oﬃce oneself and paying a politician to
run in one’s place.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we present a simple model of businessman
candidacy. We test the predictions of this model using data from Russian gubernatorial
elections in Section 2. We oﬀer concluding thoughts in Section 3.
41 A Simple Model of Businessman Candidacy
In this section we present a simple model to identify the conditions under which businessmen
run for oﬃce. We assume a political economy populated by a large but ﬁnite number of
businessmen, a large but ﬁnite number of politicians, and a continuum of voters. Both
businessmen and politicians are potentially candidates for oﬃce. At issue in the election
are policies which are important to the businessmen, and over which the businessmen have
conﬂicting preferences. Politicians, in contrast to businessmen, are indiﬀerent over the set
of policies.
Both businessmen and politicians desire holding oﬃce for its own sake, and receive an
exogenous payoﬀ (formal compensation) of v if they win the election. However, they diﬀer
in their opportunity cost of running, where any businessman incurs a cost k > 0 if he runs,
whereas any politician incurs a cost of δ > 0 if he runs. The key assumption of the model
is that running for oﬃce is more costly for businessmen than for professional politicians. In
particular, we assume that δ < v
2 < k. This assumption implies that if only the exogenous
payoﬀ from holding oﬃce is at stake then a politician prefers to enter a race that he has a
50-50 chance of winning, but a businessman does not.
The policy space X is a convex subset of Euclidean space, where we refer to any individual
policy as x, and assume that businessmen have continuous preferences over x ∈ X. We
denote the utility that any businessman i receives from policy x as ui (x). Further, to assure
a unique outcome to the lobbying game described below, we assume that for all subsets
B of the set of all businessmen from which no more than one businessman is missing, the
solution to maxx
P
i∈B ui (x) is uniquely deﬁned. In addition, we assume that there is a
conﬂict of interest among businessmen, in the sense that any policy which neglects the
interests of only one businessman makes all other businessmen weakly better oﬀ, relative
to the policy implemented when the interests of all businessmen are taken into account.
Formally, we say that for each businessman i and j, with i 6= j, ui (x−j) ≥ ui (¯ x), where:
x−j ≡ argmaxx
P
i6=j ui (x) and ¯ x ≡ argmaxx
P
i ui (x).
5Voters have continuous preferences over policies in X and cast their ballot for the candi-
date whose expected policy choice they most prefer. If there is more than one such candidate
then voters decide among those candidates using an equal-probability rule; if there is only
one candidate in the race then that candidate wins by default. To capture the idea that
businessmen have preferences which may diverge from those of the general population, we
assume that voters’ preferences are identical with a common most-preferred policy ˆ x 6= ¯ x.
For concreteness, one might think of x as a vector of subsidies to each businessman which
must be ﬁnanced through tax increases or cuts in public-goods provision. We assume that
voting is by plurality rule, though given the assumption of voter homogeneity a variety of
other voting rules produce the same outcome.5
Following candidate entry and prior to voting, each candidate – businessman or profes-
sional politician – announces a policy to be implemented after the election. For now, we
ignore the potential role of campaign ﬁnance, assuming that voters have ﬁxed policy pref-
erences. In Section 1.2 below, we allow for the possibility that businessmen may inﬂuence
voter preferences and thus the policies adopted during the electoral campaign through the
provision of campaign ﬁnance.
We are interested in the relationship between businessmen’s entry decisions and institu-
tions which make reneging on campaign promises costly. To explore this relationship, we
consider two versions of the model. In the ﬁrst version, we assume that campaign promises
are binding, so that the election winner implements the policy announced during the cam-
paign. In the second version, we assume that campaign promises are not binding. In this
case, the election winner may costlessly ignore promises made during the election campaign,
and may choose any policy x ∈ X. Businessmen may attempt to inﬂuence this policy choice
through the promise of contributions; we model this lobbying process as a “menu auction” as
5At the expense of additional notation, we could assume some heterogeneity of voter preferences. For
example, employees of businessmen might have diﬀerent preferences over policy than non-employees. While
the logic of spatial competition in a multidimensional policy space implies that there is generically no
equilibrium when voters are heterogeneous, an equilibrium does exist and our results hold so long as there
is suﬃcient homogeneity to assure a unique policy in the core (see, e.g., Austen-Smith and Banks, 1999).
6in Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and Grossman and Helpman (1994). In particular, in the
lobbying game each businessman (with the exception of the winning candidate in the event
that a businessman is the election winner) oﬀers a contribution schedule Ci (x) which oﬀers
a particular contribution for every policy x ∈ X. Following receipt of the schedules, the elec-
tion winner chooses x. We assume that the preferences of businessmen over ﬁnal outcomes
can be represented as the sum of ui (x) and of monetary contributions from lobbying; these
contributions are negative for a businessman who does not hold oﬃce and provides nonzero
contributions in equilibrium, and positive for a businessman who holds oﬃce and receives
nonzero contributions in equilibrium. Politicians do not have preferences over policy and,
therefore, if elected, choose policy to maximize lobbying contributions from businessmen.
All elements of the game are common knowledge. The timing of events is as follows:
1. Entry: Simultaneously and independently, the businessmen and politicians decide
whether or not to enter the race.
2. Platform choice: Each candidate promises to implement some policy x ∈ X if elected
3. Election: Voters cast their ballot for the candidate whose expected policy choice they
most prefer.
4. Policy choice: In the model with binding campaign promises, the winning candidate
implements the policy promised during the campaign. In the model with no commit-
ment to campaign promises, policy is chosen through a lobbying process modeled as a
menu auction.
In Section 1.2 we introduce an additional campaign-ﬁnance stage following entry and prior
to platform choice.
1.1 Equilibrium
We solve for subgame-perfect equilibria of each of the two versions of the model: 1) the model
with binding campaign promises, and 2) the model without binding campaign promises. As
7we discuss below, we restrict attention to equilibria in which contribution schedules are
compensating.
Equilibrium in model with binding campaign promises
When campaign promises are binding, the equilibrium outcome is easy to derive. Clearly, if
there are two or more candidates, then any candidate promises to implement voters’ most-
preferred policy ˆ x. If every candidate has committed to ˆ x, then any deviation to some other
platform results in that candidate’s losing with certainty. In contrast, if some candidate has
not committed to ˆ x, then at least one candidate could increase his probability of winning
by deviating to ˆ x. This implies that every candidate who has entered wins with equal
probability, and enough candidates enter to exhaust the exogenous rent from holding oﬃce
v. The assumption that v
2 > δ implies that an equilibrium always exists, and that in any
equilibrium there are at least two candidates, since otherwise some politician would enter to
have a chance to win v. In particular, given that at least one politician enters, the number








The inequality on the left says that no additional politician wants to enter the race, given
that Nb candidates enter. Note that if no politician wants to enter then because k > δ no
businessman wants to enter either. The inequality on the right says that some politician ﬁnds
it worthwhile to enter the race if (Nb − 1) other candidates also enter. (Below we consider
the question of whether a businessman candidate would want to stay in the race if there are
(Nb − 1) other candidates.) Intuitively, the larger the exogenous payoﬀ from holding oﬃce
and the smaller the cost of entry, the higher the number of candidates in equilibrium.
We are primarily interested in the conditions under which a businessman would choose
to enter the race as a candidate. The following proposition establishes that the only circum-
stance in which a businessman could be in the race when campaign promises are binding is
8when he is one of two candidates. As the same policy ˆ x is adopted so long as there is some
political competition, a businessman in a race with at least three candidates could save the
cost of entry and receive the same policy by instead not entering.
Proposition 1. When campaign promises are binding, the only possible equilibrium with a
businessman candidate is a two-candidate equilibrium.
Proof. We have already established that there is no one-candidate equilibrium. To see that
there is no equilibrium with N ≥ 3 candidates, one of which is some businessman i, assume
otherwise. Then the payoﬀ for businessman i in equilibrium is ui (ˆ x) + v
N − k. In contrast,
if businessman i deviates by not entering his payoﬀ is ui (ˆ x). As k > v
2 by assumption, the
payoﬀ from deviation is greater. Thus, there is no equilibrium with N ≥ 3 candidates, and
the only possible equilibrium with a businessman candidate is a two-candidate equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
A two-candidate equilibrium with a businessman candidate may exist, even though the
exogenous rent from holding oﬃce is not high enough to justify the opportunity cost of
running for a businessman. To see this, observe that the payoﬀ for businessman i in such
an equilibrium is ui (ˆ x) + v
2 − k. In contrast, businessman i’s payoﬀ from deviating by not
entering is equal to his utility from the policy most preferred by the other candidate: if
businessman i does not enter the other candidate runs alone and so is unconstrained in his
choice of policy. Let x0 refer to this policy. Then the payoﬀ for businessman i in equilibrium
is greater than the payoﬀ from deviating so long as k ≤ [ui (ˆ x) − ui (x0)] + v
2, which is the
case so long as businessman i’s preference for ˆ x over x0 is suﬃciently great.
Any two-candidate equilibrium with a businessman candidate, however, is ineﬃcient.
The only reason the businessman stays in the race is his fear of the policy that would be
implemented if he were to leave the other candidate unopposed. But any other candidate
could play the same role, introducing political competition and forcing policy to ˆ x. Fur-
ther, a politician could play this role more cheaply than the businessman could, because by
9assumption the opportunity cost of running is less for politicians. Thus, the businessman






by having somebody else run in his place, in principle, he would be willing
to pay the politician to do so. However, even in the absence of such an agreement the deal
will stick: the politician will want to enter given that the businessman does not because his
expected payoﬀ from entry v
2 is greater than the opportunity cost of running δ.
Proposition 2. When campaign promises are binding, any equilibrium with a businessman
candidate is Pareto dominated by a two-candidate equilibrium with no businessman candi-
dates.
Proof. See above. Q.E.D.
Propositions 1 and 2 together suggest that businessman candidates should be unlikely in
the presence of institutions which make reneging on campaign promises costly.
Equilibrium in model without binding campaign promises
When campaign promises are not binding, the election winner is unconstrained by his cam-
paign promise. Policy is thus chosen after the election through a menu auction, where each
businessman i (but the election winner, if a businessman) provides the election winner with
a contribution schedule Ci (x) which oﬀers a particular contribution for every policy x ∈ X.
We restrict attention to equilibria in which contribution schedules are compensating, i.e.,
those for which diﬀerences in promised contributions reﬂect diﬀerences in the businessman’s
utility from diﬀerent policies, subject to the constraint that contributions are not negative.
Bernheim and Whinston (1986) show that any compensating equilibrium of a menu-auction
game is jointly eﬃcient.6 This implies that regardless of who wins the election the policy
implemented is ¯ x ≡ argmaxx
P
i ui (x), where we recall that politicians (once in oﬃce) care
6Bernheim and Whinston refer to compensating equilibrium as “truthful” equilibria. We follow Grossman
and Helpman (1994) in using the term “compensating,” which emphasizes that diﬀerences across policies in
promised contributions must compensate the businessman for changes in his policy utility.
10only about maximizing lobbying contributions and that the payoﬀ for any businessman is
linear in contributions. Intuitively, the fact that contribution schedules are compensating
means that the election winner fully internalizes the impact of changes in policy on each
businessman’s utility. In particular, this is the case regardless of whether the election winner
is a politician (in which case the election winner chooses the policy jointly eﬃcient among
all businessmen) or a businessman (in which case the election winner internalizes the eﬀect
of changes in policy on his own utility and on the utilities of every other businessman).7 An-
ticipating the outcome of the lobbying game, voters are indiﬀerent among candidates when
campaign promises are not binding. Consequently, if there are N candidates each wins with
probability 1
N.
Even though the equilibrium policy is the same regardless of the election winner, the
distribution of rents is not. A politician who wins receives lobbying contributions from all
businessmen, whereas a businessman who wins saves on his own lobbying contribution and
receives contributions from all other businessmen. The following proposition establishes that
there is thus a common endogenous rent from holding oﬃce, regardless of the identity of the
election winner.
Proposition 3. When campaign promises are not binding, there is an endogenous rent R
from holding oﬃce common to all election winners – politicians and businessmen. This rent






[ui (x−j) − ui (¯ x)], (1)
where x−j ≡ argmaxx
P
i6=j ui (x) and ¯ x ≡ argmaxx
P
i ui (x).
Proof. First, consider the case of an election winner who is a politician. In equilibrium the
7This sharp prediction follows from the assumption that politicians care about lobbying contributions but
not about policy. Exploring the consequences for businessman candidacy when politicians also care about
policy may be a useful direction for future research, but the assumption of purely opportunistic politicians
captures the central idea that the distribution of rents depends on the identity of the election winner when
campaign promises are not binding.
11contribution by each businessman j must leave the politician indiﬀerent between (a) imple-
menting ¯ x and receiving
P
i CP
i (¯ x), where CP
i (.) is the equilibrium contribution schedule
provided by businessman i when a politician is the election winner, and (b) walking away
























This is equal to x−j ≡ argmaxx
P
i6=j ui (x) if ui (x−j) ≥ ui (¯ x) for each businessman i, which
is an assumption of the model. Thus, xP
−j = x−j.
We can then express the politician’s indiﬀerence between ¯ x and x−j as
P
i CP
i (¯ x) =
P
i6=j CP
i (x−j). Using this, we can derive the contribution from businessman j when the
election winner is a politician as CP





i (x−j) − CP
i (¯ x)

. Using again the
assumption that contribution schedules are compensating, we can rewrite this as CP
j (¯ x) =
P
i6=j [ui (x−j) − ui (¯ x)].
Now consider the case when the election winner is some businessman k. In this case, the
contribution by any other businessman j must leave businessman k indiﬀerent between (a)
implementing ¯ x and receiving uk (¯ x) +
P
i6=k Ck
i (¯ x), where Ck
i (.) is the equilibrium contri-
bution schedule provided by businessman i when businessman k is the election winner, and


























Similarly to the argument above, xk
−j = x−j given the assumption that ui (x−j) ≥ ui (¯ x) for
each businessman i. We can then express businessman k’s indiﬀerence between ¯ x and x−j
as uk (¯ x) +
P
i6=k Ck
i (¯ x) = uk (x−j) +
P
i6=j,k Ck
i (x−j), which gives the following equilibrium
12contribution for businessman j given that the election winner is businessman k: Ck
j (¯ x) =





i (x−j) − Ck
i (¯ x)

. Using the assumption that contribution
schedules are compensating, we can rewrite this as follows: Ck
j (¯ x) = [uk (x−j) − uk (¯ x)] +
P
i6=j,k [ui (x−j) − ui (¯ x)] =
P
i6=j [ui (x−j) − ui (¯ x)]. Thus, the equilibrium contribution by
any businessman not in oﬃce is the same regardless of the identity of the election winner.
Using ¯ Cj (¯ x) to refer to this contribution, we deﬁne the endogenous rent RP from holding
oﬃce for any politician as the sum of contributions received from all businessmen: RP ≡
P




i6=j [ui (x−j) − ui (¯ x)]. Similarly, we deﬁne the endogenous rent Rk from
holding oﬃce for any businessman k as the diﬀerence between the payoﬀ received when in
oﬃce (a function of both the policy implemented and the lobbying contributions received) and




uk (¯ x) +
X
j6=k














[ui (x−j) − ui (¯ x)].
Consequently, there is a common endogenous rent R ≡ RP = Rk. Q.E.D.
How does the endogenous rent R to be earned by the election winner depend on the
political-economic environment? Formally, Expression 1 is the sum of contributions paid by
each businessman when the election winner is a politician, and is the sum of contributions
paid by all other businessmen when a businessman is the election winner plus the contribution
which the election winner would otherwise pay if he were not on the receiving end of the
lobbying process. Intuitively, R is bigger when the conﬂict of interest among businessmen is
greater, because then the election winner is able to more eﬀectively play one businessman’s
interests oﬀ of another’s.
When campaign promises are binding the circumstances under which businessmen might
13choose to run for oﬃce are sharply circumscribed. In contrast, when campaign promises are
not binding the election winner has monopoly power which may be used to extract rents.
Because the only way to extract these rents is to actually hold oﬃce, a businessman may
be tempted to run. The following proposition gives the precise condition for existence of an
equilibrium with a businessman candidate.
Proposition 4. When campaign promises are not binding, there exists an equilibrium with




Proof. Recall that policy is the same regardless of the election winner, so that voters are
indiﬀerent among candidates and so all candidates win the exogenous rent v and endogenous
rent R with equal probability. Then no politician (and no businessman because k > δ) who
has not entered the race wants to deviate by entering, given that N candidates have entered,
if v+R
N+1 − δ ≥ 0. In addition, no businessman who has entered the race wants to deviate by
not entering if v+R
N −k ≥ 0. These together imply the condition in the proposition. Q.E.D.
For δ and k suﬃciently close to each other (and thus suﬃciently close to v
2 because by
assumption δ < v
2 < k) there is always an N which satisﬁes the condition in Proposition 4. If,
however, the payoﬀ from holding oﬃce (v + R) is suﬃciently large relative to the diﬀerence
in entry costs of politicians and businessmen, then there is no equilibrium with businessman
candidates. Intuitively, when the (exogenous and endogenous) rent from holding oﬃce is
large, politicians crowd out businessmen: though both may beneﬁt from holding oﬃce, the
cost of entry for politicians is lower. For a businessman to want to stay in the race the
number of candidates must be suﬃciently low to guarantee a large enough chance of winning
to oﬀset the cost of entry. But when the rents from oﬃce are large this requirement is
inconsistent with the equilibrium condition that no other politician wants to enter the race.
Proposition 5. When campaign promises are not binding, there exists no equilibrium with
a businessman candidate if the payoﬀ from holding oﬃce (v + R) is suﬃciently large.
14Proof. The condition in Proposition 4 does not hold for any N when v+R
δ − 1 > v+R
k , i.e.,
when (v + R) > δk
k−δ. This is clearly the case for (v + R) suﬃciently large. Q.E.D.
1.2 Campaign ﬁnance
Thus far we have assumed that voters have ﬁxed policy preferences. In this environment,
the ability of businessmen to aﬀect the election outcome is limited to entering the race and,
when campaign promises are binding, adopting a platform. In practice, voters’ preferences,
and thus the election outcome, may be inﬂuenced by campaign spending. To the extent that
businessmen have disproportionate access to funds for campaign ﬁnance, one might think
that businessmen would be more likely to run for public oﬃce even when campaign promises
are binding. In fact, this is not the case.
We model the role of campaign ﬁnance in the following reduced-form way. At the begin-
ning of the game one voter is chosen at random to be the opinion maker. Following entry
but prior to platform choice, the opinion maker announces a policy x ∈ X, which voters then
adopt as their most-preferred policy. The opinion maker most prefers policy ˆ x 6= ¯ x. The
opinion maker, however, is susceptible to inﬂuence by businessmen, who lobby the opinion
maker in a menu auction analogous to the one which follows the election when campaign
promises are not binding. In particular, each businessman i oﬀers a contribution schedule
Di (x), which promises a particular contribution for every possible announcement x of the
opinion maker. We assume that the opinion maker maximizes the sum of his payoﬀ from
policy x and from lobbying contributions paid to her. As with the lobbying game which
follows the election when campaign promises are not binding, we restrict our attention to
equilibria in which contribution schedules are compensating.8
8An alternative approach would be to assume that some voters have preferences over candidates which
are unrelated to candidate platforms and which may be inﬂuenced by campaign spending, as in Baron
(1994). This setup is analytically intractable with more than two candidates. For the special case of two
candidates, however, an analogous result may be derived: businessmen prefer that professional politicians
run in their place when campaign promises are binding, as campaign ﬁnance may be used to inﬂuence voter
preferences over candidates – and therefore the platforms adopted by those candidates in equilibrium –
whether a businessman runs himself or not.
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tive to lobby the opinion maker to inﬂuence the campaign promises which candidates make.
So long as there are at least two candidates, the policy announced by the opinion maker will
be adopted by each candidate, and that policy will be implemented by the election winner.
The opinion maker thus acts as policy maker, and lobbying contributions from businessmen
follow accordingly. Given the restriction to compensating contribution schedules, the policy
announced by the opinion maker is jointly eﬃcient among the opinion maker and the busi-
nessmen. Denote this policy as ˜ x, and the equilibrium contribution made by businessman
i to the opinion maker as ˜ Di (˜ x). The payoﬀ to any businessman i from entering the race,
given that there are (N − 1) other candidates, is then ui (˜ x) + v
N − k − ˜ Di (˜ x). In contrast,
the payoﬀ from deviating by staying out of the race, so long as there are at least two other
candidates, is ui (˜ x) − ˜ Di (˜ x). Given our assumption that k > v
2, the ﬁrst expression is
always less than the second. Therefore, as in the model with no campaign ﬁnance, there
is no equilibrium with three or more candidates, at least one of which is a businessman
candidate. (Similarly, we may show that as in Proposition 2 there may be a two-candidate
equilibrium with a businessman candidate, but that this equilibrium is Pareto-dominated by
a two-candidate equilibrium with no businessman candidates.) Intuitively, when campaign
promises are binding, a businessman need not be in the race to aﬀect the policy which is
implemented after the election. Interestingly, if the opinion maker does not care about policy
but only about lobbying contributions paid to her, then the equilibrium policy outcome is
the same as in the case where campaign promises are not binding and there is no campaign
ﬁnance.
Now consider the case where campaign promises are not binding. Businessmen have no
incentive to lobby the opinion maker. As in the model without campaign ﬁnance, voters
anticipate that whoever is elected will be unconstrained by campaign promises and so will
implement ¯ x. Given that, campaign promises are meaningless, so voters are indiﬀerent
among all candidates regardless of the position adopted by the opinion maker after being
16lobbied by businessmen. The condition for existence of an equilibrium with a businessman
candidate is then exactly that given by Proposition 4 above.
In summary, even though campaign ﬁnance may aﬀect the equilibrium policy outcome
(but only when campaign promises are binding), the likelihood of businessman candidates
is unaﬀected. As in the model without campaign ﬁnance, businessman candidates are likely
only when campaign promises are not binding.
2 Empirical Analysis
Our theoretical model generates two distinct testable hypotheses. First, Propositions 1 and 2
suggest that businessman candidates should be less likely in the presence of institutions which
make reneging on campaign promises costly, as political competition in such an environment
forces any candidate – businessman or politician – to adopt a platform consistent with
the interests of the general population. Second, Proposition 5 states that when institutions
which make reneging on campaign promises costly are absent, businessman candidates should
be less likely when returns to businessmen from policy inﬂuence are large, as professional
politicians with low opportunity costs of political participation crowd out businessmen with
high opportunity costs.
Does the empirical evidence support these predictions? We address this question by ex-
amining the incidence of businessman candidates in Russian gubernatorial elections between
1991 and 2005.9 Russia provides an ideal empirical setting for two reasons. First, Russia’s
democratic institutions are immature and so provide few incentives for elected politicians to
not break campaign promises. In many regions the media are too biased, and government
decision making insuﬃciently transparent, for citizens to monitor the actions of elected of-
ﬁcials (e.g., Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya, 2004; Fish, 2005). Political parties are also weak,
increasing the scope for opportunistic behavior by individual politicians (e.g., White, Rose
9Regional executives in Russia are known variously as “governor,” “president,” and (in Moscow, which
has regional status) “mayor.” For simplicity, we use the term “governor” to refer to any regional executive.
17and McAllister, 1997; Rose and Munro, 2002; Colton and McFaul, 2003; Tucker, 2006; Han-
son, Forthcoming). This is especially true of regional elections, where few candidates are
nominated by political parties, and those parties which are active are often local organizations
with little ideological orientation.10 As a consequence of this institutional weakness, “rather
than invest in a candidate’s election,” businessmen “buy the cooperation of [politicians] on
particular votes or issues” (Treisman, 1998, p. 14). Consistent with our argument, one might
therefore expect the phenomenon of businessmen candidacy to be pervasive, as businessmen
seek to extract rents and avoid lobbying costs by holding public oﬃce themselves. Indeed, as
we show below, approximately sixty percent of Russian gubernatorial elections between 1991
and 2005 had at least one businessmen candidate.11 Second, there is substantial institutional
variation across Russia’s 89 regions, in part the result of the political and economic decen-
tralization of the early 1990s (e.g., Shleifer and Treisman, 2000). We exploit this variation
to test the model’s predictions by comparing the likelihood of businessman candidacy across
diﬀerent regional political-economic environments.
2.1 Data and measures
Russian gubernatorial elections were held from June 2001 through February 2005. Since then
regional executives have been chosen by a system of presidential nomination. In all, there
were 247 elections in 88 regions (out of 89 total) during the period of direct gubernatorial
election.12 Each of the 88 regions had at least two and at most ﬁve gubernatorial elections,
10Golosov (2004) reports that party nominees accounted for a mere 15 and 7 percent, respectively, of
winning gubernatorial candidates in two election cycles between 1995 and 1999. McFaul (2001) discusses
the ideological weakness of regional political parties.
11There is evidence that businessmen are also running in large numbers in other elections in Russia. For
example, the Russian newspaper Kommersant reports that 77 members (out of 450) of the Duma (the
lower house of parliament) elected in 1999, and 66 members elected in 2003, were “direct representatives”
of business (“Biznes i Vlast: Zakonodatelnyi Sovet Direktorov [Business and Power: The Legislature as
Boardroom],” Kommersant, December 26, 2003). Published and unpublished data on business representation
in the 2003 Duma gathered by the Moscow Times suggest that the latter number may be a substantial
underestimate (“Duma Has a Big Business Lobby,” Moscow Times, January 20, 2004; Francesca Mereu,
Moscow Times, private communication).
12One region – the republic of Dagestan – never had direct gubernatorial elections; executives were instead
appointed by the regional parliament.
18with an average of 2.8 elections per region.
We gathered information on the business aﬃliation of candidates in each of these elections,
drawing on two sources: 1) oﬃcial candidate biographies published by the Russian Central
Election Commission, and 2) the Labyrinth database, available at www.labyrinth.ru, which
provides biographies of Russian businessmen and politicians. We classiﬁed a candidate in
a gubernatorial race as a businessman candidate if 1) at the time of the electoral race the
candidate was a major owner and/or top manager of a business, and 2) this business was
not acquired by the candidate while holding public oﬃce. The latter situation describes not
a businessman candidate but a professional politician who used public oﬃce for private gain.
As Table 1 shows, according to this deﬁnition there was at least one businessman candidate
in 151 of the 247 elections. Of these, in 104 elections a businessman candidate received
at least ﬁve percent of the vote, and in 66 elections a businessman candidate received at
least ten percent of the vote. In all there were seventeen winners who were businessman
candidates.
We deﬁne the following three dummy variables: 1) businessman candidate, which takes
a value of one if there was any businessman candidate in the race, and zero otherwise; 2)
businessman candidate with more than ﬁve percent of vote, which takes a value of one if there
was any businessman candidate in the race who received at least ﬁve percent of the vote,
and zero otherwise; and 3) businessman candidate with more than ten percent of vote, which
takes a value of one if there was any businessman candidate in the race who received at least
ten percent of the vote, and zero otherwise. The ﬁrst variable indicates the presence of any
businessman candidate in the race, whereas the second and the third indicate the presence
of a “serious” businessman candidate, i.e., of a candidate with a realistic expectation of
winning. This distinction is important, as businessmen may have non-electoral incentives
to run for oﬃce. In Russia in particular businessmen sometimes (mis-)use the free media
access guaranteed by law to each electoral candidate in order to advertise their products
(Kryshtanovskaya, 2005). We primarily look at “serious” businessman candidates as we are
19interested only in businessman candidates who run for electoral reasons.
To test the relationship between institutional environment and the likelihood of (serious)
businessman candidates, we consider three characteristics of Russian regions which may
reﬂect constraints on the ability of public oﬃcials to renege on campaign promises: media
freedom, government transparency, and strength of national political parties. Media freedom
and government transparency allow voters to better monitor public oﬃcials and so to punish
oﬃce holders who have reneged on campaign promises. Strong political parties can more
easily enforce party discipline and therefore prevent opportunistic behavior by their members.
We therefore anticipate that businessman candidates should be less likely in regions with
high media freedom, high government transparency, and strong parties. Data sources and
summary statistics for these and other independent variables are given in Table 1.
Of these three institutional variables, two are expert ratings available only as cross-
sectional data. The index of media freedom is collected and published by the nongovern-
mental organization “Public Expertise,” and measures restrictions in regional legislation on
information dissemination through the media. The index of government transparency is pro-
vided by “Media Soyuz,” an independent association of journalists, and measures the extent
to which policy decisions made by the executive branch of the regional government (i.e., the
governor’s oﬃce) were accessible to the general public through the media and publication
on oﬃcial websites. Both indexes were published in 2000 and reﬂect conditions in Russian
regions during the 1990s. We discuss potential endogeneity concerns related to these vari-
ables later in the paper. Missing data for these measures and for regional income per capita
(discussed below) reduce the number of observations somewhat from the 247 elections in the
data set.13
We constructed the third variable, a proxy for the strength of national political parties,
for each region and each year using information on the party aﬃliation of candidates for the
13The media freedom index was not constructed for eight regions, and the government transparency index
for two regions. Russia’s statistical agency did not publish income data separately for autonomous okrugs
for some years included in our sample.
20Duma, the lower chamber of the Russian parliament. From 1991 to 2005 there were four
parliamentary elections in Russia (in 1993, 1995, 1999, and 2003). In each of these elections,
one half of the members of the Duma were chosen by majoritarian voting with typically
multiple single-member districts (SMDs) in each region; the other half of the seats were ﬁlled
according to proportional representation with party-list voting in a single national district.
According to the electoral rules for these elections, SMD candidates could be nominated
either by a political party or by an independent group of voters of a certain minimum size.
We deﬁne strength of parties as the proportion of SMD candidates across all districts
in a region who were nominated by national political parties in the previous election rather
than by independent groups of voters. As there were four parliamentary elections in Russia
between 1991 and 2005, this measure varies over time as well as across regions. Over these
four elections, 23 percent of all SMD candidates were nominated by national political parties,
where we designate a party as national if its national vote in that Duma election exceeded
the legal threshold to receive seats through proportional representation.
Testing for any crowding out of businessman candidates by professional politicians re-
quires a measure of the attractiveness of holding gubernatorial oﬃce. Our primary focus
is the endogenous rent R from holding oﬃce: the unoﬃcial “compensation” from lobbying
which is received (or saved) by the election winner. We assume that the opportunity to
extract such rents is higher in regions with abundant natural resources, as the opportunity
to play one businessman oﬀ of another may be especially large in such regions (e.g., Sonin,
2003; Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier, 2004; Mehlum, Moene and Torvik, 2006). Under
this assumption, the prediction of the model is that businessman candidates should be less
likely in regions which are rich in natural resources, but only in the absence of institutions
which make reneging on campaign promises costly. We test this prediction by interacting
the institutional variables discussed above with log(percentage of regional employment in
extraction + 1). We use the log transformation to more closely approximate a normal distri-
bution. In the discussion to follow we refer more simply to “log percentage of employment
21in extraction” or “log extraction share.”
2.2 Empirical methodology
To examine the eﬀect on businessman candidacy of institutions which make reneging on cam-
paign promises costly, we estimate a probit model on the pooled sample of all gubernatorial
elections, where the probability of a businessman candidate is
Pr(bit = 1) = αt + βmr + γprt + δdrt + η
0Xit + εit. (2)
where i indexes gubernatorial elections, r indexes regions, and t indexes years; bit denotes
one of the three dummy variables for presence of a businessman candidate in the race; mr
is either media freedom or government transparency; prt is strength of parties; drt is log
extraction share; and Xirt is a vector of control variables described below. Our hypothesis
is that businessman candidates are less likely in the presence of institutions which make
reneging on campaign promises costly, i.e., that β < 0 and γ < 0. We correct standard
errors to allow for clustering of error terms (εit) within regions.
To test our hypothesis that businessmen are crowded out by professional politicians when
institutions which make reneging on campaign promises costly are weak and returns from
policy inﬂuence are high, we study the diﬀerential eﬀect of the log percentage of employment
in extraction in regions with strong and weak political institutions by estimating two probit
regression models:
Pr(bit = 1) = αt + βmr + γprt + δdrt + ζmrdrt + η
0Xit + εit; (3)
Pr(bit = 1) = αt + βmr + γprt + δdrt + ζprtdrt + η
0Xit + εit. (4)
Our prediction is that ζ > 0 in both of these equations. As with the previous model, we
correct standard errors to allow for clustering of error terms within regions.
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be correlated with both the likelihood of businessman candidacy and our measures of insti-
tutions and rents from holding oﬃce. We include dummy variables for two regional desig-
nations: republic status (21 regions) and autonomous okrug status (11 regions). Republic
status implies the presence of a titular ethnic group and typically greater autonomy from the
federal center, whereas autonomous okrug status implies that the region is geographically and
– to some extent – administratively a part of another region. In both cases the institutional
environment may diﬀer from that in other regions in a way which inﬂuences the likelihood
of businessman candidacy. In addition, we control for (log) population and (log) regional
income per capita, as both formal compensation and “ego” rents from holding oﬃce (v in the
model) may be larger in populous and wealthy regions. We include a dummy variable equal
to one if the incumbent governor ran for reelection, as the advantages of incumbency in an
electoral contest may inﬂuence the incentives for a businessman to participate in the race.
We also include the number of candidates in the election as a covariate, as our dependent
variable is the probability that at least one candidate is a businessman candidate (with a cer-
tain percentage of the vote), which we do not want to conﬂate with the number of “draws”
from the pool of potential candidates. Finally, we include year dummies as covariates to
prevent spurious correlation related to variation over time in both the average number of
businessman candidates and the average level of some of our independent variables.
In the next section we report our main results. Following that we discuss robustness and
possible endogeneity problems.
2.3 Empirical Results
Our ﬁrst empirical result is that variation in the regional institutional environment has ex-
planatory power only for the presence of “serious” businessman candidates, i.e. only for
businessman candidates with a nontrivial chance of winning. There is virtually no relation-
ship between our measures of media freedom, government transparency, and party strength
23on the one hand, and the probability that there is any businessman candidate in the race
on the other. (For conciseness, we do not report estimation results.) Henceforth we focus on
explaining variation in the presence of “serious” businessman candidates, deﬁned as those
who received at least ﬁve or ten percent of all votes cast.
Figure 1 illustrates our baseline empirical ﬁndings, showing adjusted partial residual plots
for linear probability models analogous to the probit models in Equations 2 and 3. Consistent
with the ﬁrst hypothesis, businessman candidates are less likely in regions with relatively free
media, controlling for other characteristics of regions and elections which may be correlated
with both businessman candidacy and media freedom. As it may be more costly to renege
on campaign promises when media can report on the actions of elected oﬃcials, this suggests
that businessman candidacy is negatively correlated with institutions which help to make
campaign promises binding. Consistent with the second hypothesis, the interaction of media
freedom and log extraction share is positive, again after controlling for other characteristics
of regions and elections. As the estimated coeﬃcient on log extraction share is negative (not
illustrated here, but reported below for the probit models), this indicates that crowding-out
eﬀects are stronger when the media are relatively unfree than when they are relatively free.
To more formally test these hypotheses, we turn to probit estimation. Table 2 presents
results from these models, reporting estimated marginal eﬀects on the probability of a busi-
nessman candidate with at least ﬁve percent and ten percent of the vote. The ﬁrst four
columns report results from the probit model which tests the direct eﬀects of our main ex-
planatory variables (Equation 2 above). We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative association between
regional institutions which make it more diﬃcult to renege on campaign promises and the
probability of having a serious businessman candidate in the gubernatorial race. The esti-
mated eﬀects of media freedom, government transparency, and strength of parties all have
the predicted negative sign, and all are statistically signiﬁcant but for the estimated eﬀect of
strength of parties on the probability of a businessman candidate with at least ﬁve percent
of the vote.
24The economic signiﬁcance of these results is as follows. A one standard deviation increase
in the media freedom index leads to a fourteen and ﬁfteen percentage point fall in the prob-
ability of having a businessman candidate with ﬁve and ten percent of the vote, respectively.
Government transparency has a somewhat weaker eﬀect: a one standard deviation increase
in the government transparency index leads roughly to an eight percentage point fall in the
probability of a businessman candidate in the race with either ﬁve percent or ten percent of
the vote. Finally, an increase of ten percentage points in the share of SMD parliamentary
candidates nominated by political parties (our measure of party strength) results in a 5.6
percentage point fall in the probability of a businessman candidate with ten percent of the
vote.
The ﬁrst four columns of Table 2 also show that the average eﬀect of log extraction share
(our measure of endogenous rents from holding political oﬃce) on the probability of busi-
nessman candidates is consistently negative, though insigniﬁcant in those models with a 5%
“seriousness threshold” for businessman candidates and only marginally signiﬁcant in those
models with a 10% threshold. The consistently negative average eﬀect of log percentage of
employment in extraction is suggestive of the overall weakness of democratic institutions in
Russia’s regions, as the model predicts crowding-out eﬀects only in the absence of institu-
tions which make reneging on campaign promises costly. To examine the impact of regional
variation in these institutions, we estimate the diﬀerential eﬀect of resource abundance on
businessman candidacy in regions with strong and weak democratic institutions by inter-
acting log extraction share with our institutional measures (Equations 3 and 4 above). We
report estimation results from these models in Columns 5-10 of Table 2. Consistent with
the model’s prediction, the estimated eﬀect of the interaction between media freedom and
government transparency on the one hand, and log percentage of employment in extraction
on the other, is positive and statistically signiﬁcant (Columns 5-8). Only in regions with
relatively low media freedom and government transparency (where businessman candidates
generally are more frequent) does resource abundance lead to a decrease in the probability
25of serious businessman candidates. The estimated eﬀect of the interaction of log extraction
share and party strength also has the predicted negative sign, but is imprecisely estimated
(Columns 9 and 10).
To illustrate the size of these crowding-out eﬀects, we compare the eﬀect of resource
extraction on the probability of businessman candidacy in regions with strong and weak
institutions. In regions with media freedom one half standard deviation below the mean, a
one standard deviation increase in log extraction share leads to an eleven percentage point
decrease in the probability of a businessman candidate with ten percent of the vote. In
contrast, in regions with media freedom one half standard deviation above the mean, an
increase of one standard deviation in log extraction share leads to an 4.4 percentage point
increase in the probability of a businessman candidate with ten percent of the vote. The
interaction of government transparency and resource abundance is similar. For regions with
government transparency one half standard deviation below and above the mean, a one
standard deviation increase in log extraction share results in a decrease of thirteen and
0.8 percentage points, respectively, in the probability of a businessman candidate with ten
percent of the vote.
Overall, the evidence is consistent with the two main predictions of the model. First,
regions with freer media and more transparent government – and hence stronger commit-
ment to campaign promises – witness signiﬁcantly fewer businessman candidates, with some
evidence of similar eﬀects for party strength. Second, businessman candidates are crowded
out by professional politicians when the endogenous rents from holding oﬃce (as measured
by the resource intensity of the local economy) are high, but only when institutions which
make reneging on campaign promises costly are weak.
2.4 Robustness
We performed a number of checks to assure that our results are robust. First, we conﬁrmed
that our ﬁndings are not driven by any outlier regions or elections, searching for inﬂuential
26observations and ﬁnding none. Second, we veriﬁed that exclusion of any covariate or group
of covariates did not yield results substantively diﬀerent from those reported above. In
most cases, the particular set of covariates aﬀects neither the qualitative results nor their
statistical signiﬁcance. The coeﬃcient on the cross-term of media freedom and extraction
occasionally loses statistical signiﬁcance with the exclusion of some covariates, but the sign
and magnitude remain unchanged and t-statistics never fall below unity. Third, the results
are robust to model selection. In addition to the probit model reported in the paper, we
estimated linear probability and logit models and allowed for regional random eﬀects. The
baseline results were unaﬀected.
A crucial assumption necessary for the validity of our empirical approach is the exogeneity
of our explanatory variables. There are potentially two problems with this assumption. First,
there could be reverse causality between our dependent variables and some of the regressors.
In particular, one might argue that media freedom and government transparency could be
aﬀected by the identity of the oﬃce holder, which in turn may be correlated with businessman
candidacy. Yet as the discussion of the lobbying process makes clear, in equilibrium any oﬃce
holder should prefer less to more media freedom and government transparency. For both
businessmen and professional politicians, the opportunity to beneﬁt from control of the policy
process is greater in the absence of institutions which make reneging on campaign promises
costly. Nonetheless, we repeated our empirical exercise on the subsample of 119 elections
that took place in 2000 and later, which is the time period after our measures of media
freedom and government transparency were constructed. The results are robust: the signs
and magnitude of estimated eﬀects are very close to those in the full sample. Some eﬀects
of interest do lose signiﬁcance, but this may be attributed to a decrease in the number of
observations by approximately one half from the baseline regressions. Similarly, one could
argue that both the number of candidates and incumbent participation could be aﬀected by
participation of businessmen in the election. Intuitively, the participation decision of any
politician or businessman depends in equilibrium on who else enters. There are no good
27instruments for these regressors, but we did verify that our basic results are robust to the
exclusion of these variables from the list of covariates.
Second, endogeneity could arise from unobserved regional variation. This is a particular
concern because our empirical results are derived from cross-sectional analysis and Russia’s
regions are very diverse. We are unable to control for this variation with ﬁxed eﬀects, as
two of our three institutional measures (media freedom and government transparency) are
available only as a cross section, and our measure of resource abundance – while available
as a panel – varies little over time. To partially address this problem, we control for the
regional characteristics discussed above: republic and autonomous okrug status, population,
and income per capita. We also tried adding a number of other regional characteristics
as covariates, including population density, urban population share, average temperature,
latitude, longitude, and distance from Moscow. Our results were unaﬀected. Finally, and
perhaps more importantly, we included a control for the political preferences of electorate.
One might argue that businessman candidates would be less likely to win – and thus less
likely to run – in regions with communist electorates. At the same time, such regions might
have weaker democratic institutions. To assure that we our results are not driven by any
such spurious correlation, we included the percentage vote received by Genadii Zyuganov -
the leader of Russia’s Communist Party - in the 1996 presidential election as an additional
control. In fact, the probability of a serious businessman candidate is uncorrelated with this
variable after controlling for other regional and election characteristics, and our basic results
are unaﬀected. Overall, our results prove robust.
3 Conclusion
Why do businessmen run for oﬃce themselves despite the large opportunity costs of doing
so? In what institutional environments is this behavior most common? We have argued that
businessmen may choose to run for oﬃce only when two conditions hold. First, institutions
28which make reneging on campaign promises costly must be weak. When this is the case,
oﬃce holders have monopoly power which may be used to extract rents, and businessmen
may run to capture those rents. Second, however, the returns to policy inﬂuence must not be
too large, as otherwise the endogenous rents from holding oﬃce draw professional politicians
into the race, crowding out businessmen candidates. These theoretical results ﬁnd empirical
support in an analysis of Russian gubernatorial elections. Businessman candidates are less
likely in regions with high media freedom and government transparency, institutions which
make reneging on campaign promises costly. Further, crowding-out eﬀects are evident in
regions with large returns to policy inﬂuence, as proxied by regional resource abundance,
but only when institutions which keep oﬃce holders accountable are weak.
The major contribution of this paper is thus to show the impact of institutions on the po-
litical participation decisions of businessmen. An obvious extension would be to consider the
possibility that the political participation of other interests may be similarly aﬀected. Fur-
ther empirical investigation might take advantage of intertemporal as well as cross-sectional
variation in institutions. If the arguments in this paper hold generally, we should expect to
ﬁnd fewer professional politicians, and more “special-interest candidates,” when and where
institutions which hold elected oﬃcials to campaign promises are weak.
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Figure 1: Adjusted partial residual plots illustrating key results.
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